Measure for measure

A field-based snapshot of the implementation of results based management in UNHCR

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UNHCR’s Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES) is committed to the systematic examination and assessment of UNHCR policies, programmes, projects and practices. PDES also promotes rigorous research on issues related to the work of UNHCR and encourages an active exchange of ideas and information between humanitarian practitioners, policymakers and the research community. All of these activities are undertaken with the purpose of strengthening UNHCR’s operational effectiveness, thereby enhancing the organization’s capacity to fulfil its mandate on behalf of refugees and other persons of concern to the Office. The work of the unit is guided by the principles of transparency, independence, consultation, relevance and integrity.
# Table of contents

Summary of findings and recommendations ................................................................. 1
Introduction to the review ............................................................................................ 5
Comprehensive Needs Assessment .............................................................................. 7
Initial Budget Targets and prioritization .................................................................... 13
Global Strategic Priorities .......................................................................................... 17
Results Framework ..................................................................................................... 19
Focus .......................................................................................................................... 23
Budget structure ......................................................................................................... 27

Annex A: Terms of reference ..................................................................................... 31
Annex B: Abbreviations and acronyms .................................................................... 33
Summary of findings and recommendations

1. A UNHCR document prepared in 2006 defines Results Based Management (RBM) as “a philosophy that emphasizes the achievement of results as the essential task of management.” It goes on to say that “UNHCR uses RBM to help ensure that all organizational processes support the achievement of the right results in terms of protection and solutions for persons of concern, as effectively and efficiently as possible.”

2. The implementation of RBM has been an incremental process, starting with the introduction of logical framework approaches in the 1990s. In the past four years, however, an ambitious programme of structural and management reform within UNHCR has led to a significant acceleration in the pace at which RBM has been implemented throughout the organization.

3. This report examines six RBM-related concepts and initiatives that have been introduced during that time: the Comprehensive Needs Assessment; Initial Budget Targets and the prioritization process; the Global Strategic Priorities; the Results Framework; the Focus software and UNHCR’s new budget structure.

4. The report adopts a field-based perspective and concentrates on the impact of RBM on UNHCR’s staff, external relationships, needs assessment and planning processes, as well as the organization’s advocacy and resource mobilization activities. It provides a generic analysis, based primarily on visits to and telephone conversations with a range of different field operations.

The potential of RBM

5. The overall finding of the report is encapsulated by a quote from one staff member in the field, who observed that “the RBM plane has taken off in UNHCR, but it has not yet reached cruising speed.”

6. In accordance with this statement, the review found that the organization’s personnel have developed a heightened awareness and understanding of results-based management, programming and budgeting as a result of the six initiatives identified above. It is also clear that they are striving to make full and effective use of the new tools and mechanisms that have been placed at their disposal.

7. In general, staff members consider that RBM has a significant potential (albeit one that remains to be fully realized) to strengthen the way that UNHCR maps needs, collects and analyzes data, designs its programmes and budgets, and monitors the outcome and impact of its work in the field. RBM is also perceived as an important means of reinforcing UNHCR’s credibility, thereby strengthening the organization’s relationship with partners, especially those states that contribute to the organization’s budget.
Implementation constraints

8. At the same time, the implementation of RBM has been characterized by a number of constraints. First, the initiatives taken to date in this area have tended to focus on the introduction of new systems and processes, and have so far had a rather limited impact on UNHCR’s organizational culture. RBM is sometimes regarded as the preserve of the programme function, rather than as an organization-wide commitment, and has not yet been fully espoused by all senior managers.

9. Second, many field staff suggest that the introduction of RBM (as well as other components of the structural and management reform process) has been a very demanding one in terms of the number of new and reform-related initiatives they have been required to understand and implement at the same time. In this respect, they suggest, greater efforts might have been made to communicate - in readily comprehensible language - the rationale for, the objectives of and the advantages to be gained from RBM.

10. Third, even those staff members who have embraced the RBM approach most enthusiastically point to the constraints associated with its implementation in a complex operational agency such as UNHCR. More specifically, they refer to difficulties such as:

   • providing quantitative data on UNHCR’s output and impact in areas such as protection, advocacy, capacity-building and legislative reform, in contrast to service delivery, where quantification is more straightforward;

   • attributing changes in the situation of persons of concern to the programmes and activities of UNHCR, given the many other variables that determine the protection and well-being of the organization’s beneficiaries;

   • ensuring that country-level data is collected in an accurate, comprehensive and consistent manner, and in a way that enables the establishment of meaningful cross-country comparisons and aggregated global results.

Systems and culture

11. While many of the field staff interviewed in the course of this review stated that the introduction of RBM in UNHCR had been a challenging experience, it is important to recognize that the organization is by no means alone in this respect.

12. An evaluation of RBM in UNDP, for example, recorded some similar findings, and concluded that “for results-based management to be successful, organizations need to develop and nurture a culture of results, where enquiry, evidence and learning are valued as essential to good management.”

13. A major finding of this review is that UNHCR should now strengthen its efforts to promote such an approach within the organization at large, changing the current

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perception that RBM is primarily a matter of compliance with planning and budgeting systems and the introduction of new information technology.

14. At the same time, there are a number of more specific issues that senior management should consider in its efforts to move forward with the implementation of RBM in UNHCR. Some of those key issues are highlighted below, while the following chapters of the report provide a more detailed analysis of these and other matters.

**Comprehensive Needs Assessment and Initial Budget Targets**

- UNHCR’s new programming cycle is process-heavy and has tended to put the organization’s operations into a quasi-permanent planning mode, distracting attention from implementation;

- a disproportionate emphasis has been placed on the CNA, with the result that only limited time is available to work on the ‘real’ or prioritized plan;

- the actual scope and comprehensiveness of the CNA is unclear, and no standard methodology has been rolled out to support its implementation;

- field operations are often unsure of the basis on which their IBT has been calculated and how it relates to the comprehensive budget established as a result of the CNA;

- further consideration should be given to a proposal that would combine elements of both a needs based and resource based approach to planning and prioritization;

- there is a need to ensure that the terminology and definitions that UNHCR uses in relation to concepts such as ‘goals’ and ‘objectives’ are consistent with those employed by the UN at large;

**Global Strategic Priorities and the Results Framework**

- the GSPs are regarded as a useful checklist of UNHCR’s key activities, but they are not generally employed in the field to inform the prioritization and resource allocation process;

- there is a lack of confidence at field level in some of the targets and indicators set out in the GSPs and Results Framework, especially in relation to those activities where results are most difficult to quantify;

- there are many doubts concerning the extent to which the protection and well-being of persons of concern can be attributed to UNHCR’s activities and performance, especially in non-camp settings;

- UNHCR personnel are struggling to apportion staff time to specific operational objectives and find this requirement to be both cumbersome and frustrating;
Focus

- Focus is perceived by many staff members as the defining component of Results Based Management in UNHCR, and is widely recognized to have a substantial potential in relation to functions such as planning, programming, budgeting and monitoring;

- hitherto, that potential has been somewhat obscured and left unrealized as a result of the technical demands and difficulties associated with the new software;

- staff members in the field continue to experience problems in accessing Focus, as well as the technical support that they require to make effective use of the software;

- the problem analysis function of Focus is regarded as weak and excessively standardized, and does not provide an adequate substitute for more conventional and flexible forms of analysis;

- there is a continued need to address and improve the interface between Focus and MSRP;

Budget structure

- the new budget structure is seen as a valuable means of portraying and funding UNHCR’s expanding range of activities and persons of concern, but, in association with the CAN-IBT system, is also alleged to limit the incentive for field operations to mobilize resources;

- there is a need for greater clarification with regards to the relationship between Pillars I and III of the new structure so as to facilitate resource mobilization for local integration programmes.
Introduction to the review

15. This report has been produced by the Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES) at the request of the Deputy High Commissioner, who asked the Service to provide a ‘snapshot’ of the progress that has been made with respect to the implementation of RBM in the field.

16. As a snapshot, this report does not purport to be a traditional or full-scale evaluation. It does not, for example, attempt to assess the effectiveness of UNHCR’s recent reforms against their stated aims, particularly enhanced programme effectiveness and impact. As indicated below, the exercise was also confronted with some methodological limitations, including the need for it to be carried out rapidly, on the basis of brief missions to four operations, as well as telephone interviews with three other countries.

Terms of reference

17. The terms of reference for this review are to be found in a July 2010 Information Note that is annexed to this report. The note asked the review team to examine six RBM-related initiatives and mechanisms that relate primarily to UNHCR’s programming function.

   I. The Comprehensive Needs Assessment;
   II. Initial Budget Targets; ²
   III. The Global Strategic Priorities;
   IV. The Results Framework;
   V. Focus; and,
   VI. The new UNHCR budget structure.

18. In its examination of these initiatives, the team was also asked to address the following cross-cutting questions:

   • what impact (if any) have these initiatives had on UNHCR staff, the organization’s relationship with key partners and persons of concern?
   • have UNHCR staff been adequately trained in these initiatives, and are they able to understand and make effective use of them?
   • are these initiatives improving UNHCR’s ability to map the total needs of populations of concern?
   • are these initiatives allowing UNHCR to carry out more effective planning to meet those needs?
   • are these initiatives enhancing UNHCR’s advocacy and resource mobilization efforts?

² The Information Note refers to the Initial Budget Target. However, in subsequent discussions with the Steering Committee, it was agreed that this should in fact refer to the process of prioritization, from comprehensive plan and budget to prioritised plan and budget.
Methodology

19. The research for this review was carried out by an independent consultant and a team of UNHCR staff. The review team included staff from the Policy Development and Evaluation Service (Jeff Crisp, Esther Kiragu, and Angela Li Rosi), Organizational Development and Management Service (Anne Marie Deutschlander), Programme Budget Service (Arman Harutyunyan), and Division of Programme Support and Management (Nivene Albert, Sanaa Omer). The project was guided by a multifunctional Steering Committee.

20. The review team carried out interviews at Headquarters and in the field. At Headquarters level, the interviews aimed to explore and clarify the purpose of the RBM reforms, to document the process of development and implementation, and to gather opinions on progress so far.

21. At field level, semi-structured individual telephone interviews were held with staff from Budapest (covering Eastern and Central Europe) and Cairo offices, and a group discussion was held with the Afghanistan operation.

22. The review team divided into small and gender-balanced groups to visit Georgia, Sudan, Tanzania and Yemen. These countries were selected on the basis of regional balance, and to represent the different types of operations in which UNHCR is globally involved: emergency, protracted, refugee, IDP, relatively large and complex, as well as relatively small and straightforward.

23. These field reviews were undertaken in a common manner, employing a standard semi-structured interview schedule so as to ensure the comparability of findings. Fieldwork included two or three days of detailed discussions with UNHCR field staff, plus shorter periods of time with government representatives, implementing partners and other UN agencies.

24. In all, interviews were held with over 100 people in Headquarters and the field, covering seven different operations. Following the field visits, the review team met in Geneva to cross-check and verify their findings and to present them to senior management.

25. A draft of this report was circulated for comments to a wide range of UNHCR staff who were consulted in the course of the review. In accordance with UNHCR’s evaluation policy, those comments were treated as advisory rather than mandatory in the preparation of the final report.
Comprehensive Needs Assessment

26. The Comprehensive Needs Assessment (and Global Needs Assessment) has two primary objectives: (a) to assess the needs of persons of concern to UNHCR in a more inclusive way and therefore to design and implement more appropriate responses to those needs; and (b) to identify and demonstrate resource gaps in UNHCR operations, thereby supporting the organization’s efforts to generate additional funding and to direct those resources more effectively to beneficiaries.3

27. These objectives are spelled out in more detail in a number of UNHCR documents. According to one, the CNA/GNA involves:

... a comprehensive analysis of gaps in protection including assistance, a concise presentation of these unmet needs, agreement among all stakeholders on how to remedy the gaps and the development of proposed programmatic interventions with clear cost implications. The aim of the GNA is to provide an effective means to demonstrate the needs of people of concern, to present more precisely the funding required to address those needs and thereby strengthen priority setting and resource mobilization.

28. In the words of another document:

Key to effectively managing for results is starting with an accurate and comprehensive view of the needs that we are responsible for addressing. While UNHCR regularly assesses needs and plans on the basis of them, we have not always clearly presented the full range of needs to our donors nor developed and put forward the comprehensive plans and budgets required to meet those needs... The Global Needs Assessment (GNA) addresses this gap and, through Focus, will improve our ability to demonstrate the results of our activities, enhance our advocacy efforts by bringing into sharper relief gaps and their consequences, and provide a more compelling means to appeal for the funds needed to cover the unmet needs.

29. The Comprehensive Needs Assessment also incorporates two other concepts: the Comprehensive Plan, which is the plan of action which results from the assessment and which forms part of the annual planning process; and the Comprehensive Budget (or CNA Budget) which establishes the funding required for the Comprehensive Plan to be implemented.

30. Three of the four countries visited for this review (Georgia, Yemen and Tanzania) were countries that had piloted the Strengthening Protection Capacity

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3 The terms ‘Global Needs Assessment’ and ‘Comprehensive Needs Assessment’ are used interchangeably in some documentation, although Comprehensive Needs Assessment tends to refer to the needs assessment taking place at the country level, while the Global Needs Assessment more often refers to the worldwide collation of country assessments, and the resulting budget requirement.
Project (SPCP), an initiative that has strongly influenced UNHCR’s approach to the implementation of RBM, including the concept and tools of the CNA.

31. As a result of this experience, these operations were more comfortable with the CNA concept when it was later introduced as a global requirement. They are therefore not necessarily representative of UNHCR operations in general. It should also be pointed out that the special attention given to the SPCP countries could not be maintained once the CNA was rolled out globally.

**Findings in the field**

32. Georgia, Tanzania and Yemen conducted pilot CNAs in 2008, and developed plans and concept notes for specific activities arising from these needs assessments. In 2009, all of the operations included in this review conducted CNAs as a now standardized part of the planning process. These CNAs allowed comprehensive plans to be formulated for the following two years. In 2010, all of the operations conducted further CNAs, so as to update their comprehensive plans for 2011.

33. The comprehensive approach to needs assessment that forms the basis of the CNA and GNA was appreciated by all of the field operations consulted in the course of the review. There is a broad consensus within UNHCR on the value of mapping total beneficiary needs, demonstrating the impact of funding shortfalls and adding to the repertoire of the organization’s resource mobilization strategies.

34. Staff from different functions in the field, such as protection, programme and community services, welcomed the fact that the CNA had provided an opportunity for them to work more closely together, thereby reinforcing the multifunctional approach to programme planning, implementation and monitoring that UNHCR has espoused in recent years.

35. At the same time, a number of concerns were brought to the attention of the team undertaking this review.

**Time demands**

36. Many field personnel commented on the time-consuming nature of the CNA needs assessment and subsequent planning and budgeting process. According to one staff member, “under the old planning system we had a heart attack once a year, but we are now in a state of chronic anxiety. We are in permanent planning mode for next year and as a result have very little time to devote to the implementation of this year’s programme.” According to several interviewees, moreover, disproportionate emphasis has been placed on the CNA, leaving limited time to work on the ‘real’ or prioritized plan.

37. The needs assessment and planning exercise in 2009 was generally considered to have been more thorough and therefore more time-consuming than that undertaken in 2010. While this outcome resulted in part from the field’s growing familiarity and proficiency with the process, it also appears to have resulted from a sense that the 2010 assessment was essentially a revision of that undertaken the
previous year, and that there was not a great deal of value to be added by doing it so thoroughly the following year.

Scope

38. Some interviewees commented that it was not entirely clear which areas of need should be included in the CNA. The planning guidance provided to the field at the end of 2008 simply stated that the scope of the assessment should include “all needs for which UNHCR has a responsibility.” This left staff unsure as to:

- whether needs within the mandate of UNHCR but already met by government, NGOs or other organizations should be included in the CNA;
- how needs could be accurately assessed in situations where UNHCR is obliged to work within the constraints of government policy, including, for example, an unrealistically short official timetable for the closure of a camp whose residents are unwilling to repatriate; and,
- how longer-term needs should be assessed, especially when those needs appear to fall within the mandates of other UN agencies but where those organizations are unable or unwilling to assume such responsibility.

39. In one country, the scope of the CNA came into question because the guidance received from the Regional Bureau suggested that the operation restrict its assessment by planning only for activities that could be managed with the existing level of human resources.

40. Elsewhere, UNHCR personnel asked what ‘comprehensive’ really means in a volatile situation where beneficiary numbers and locations are changing all the time? Questions were also raised in one country as to whether contingency planning should be included in the comprehensive needs assessment, plan and budget. In that operation, the comprehensive budget initially excluded contingency planning. The budget subsequently had to be increased, once the anticipated scenario did indeed occur.

Timeframes

41. With respect to planning timeframes, one instruction from Headquarters to the field stated that “each plan is designed to cover one year and so, while comprehensive, it will nonetheless be limited to what we could reasonably implement in the planning period, even with additional staff and financial resources and knowing that in some cases, a longer period of time will be required to achieve the desired results.”

42. Despite this limitation, the CNA approach has often identified needs that will require more than a year to address, including, for example, the livelihood needs of Somali refugees in Yemen. At the same time, the stipulated one-year timeframe has left them unsure as to how incorporate long-term, multi-stage or phased solutions in their plans.
43. Interviewees also reported a tendency to prioritize short-term activities in their plans so as to fit within the timeframe they are obliged to respect, even though longer term activities might yield more effective and sustainable results. Thus while UNHCR’s country operations and Regional Bureaux often have longer term strategies in relation to persons of concern, those strategies are not formally recorded as part of the planning process and are vulnerable to the rotation of staff and changes in approach.

*Urban areas*

44. Another issue raised in the course of this review concerned the difficulty of undertaking comprehensive needs assessments in countries where there are large numbers of refugees who are accommodated outside of camps, especially if (as is increasingly the case) they are dispersed throughout large urban centres.

45. Staff members working in such contexts requested additional resources, more guidance on the methodology of urban needs assessment and an acknowledgement that it is not realistic (and perhaps unnecessary) to undertake an annual needs assessment in relation to urban refugees.

*Methodology*

46. UNHCR operations have been undertaking participatory assessments involving beneficiaries and other stakeholders for a considerable period of time, especially since the introduction of the organization’s Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming strategy (AGDM).

47. As a result, field staff were often able to bring this experience to bear on the CNA and to make use of existing assessment tools. At the same time, a number of the UNHCR personnel interviewed felt that no standard CNA methodology had been developed and wondered whether the approach they had adopted was consistent with that used in other operations. Such methodologies are evidently needed, adapted to the different context in which UNHCR works.

48. In some of the planning guidance provided to the field, there were suggestions that the needs assessment and planning methodology required by the CNA had been subsumed into Focus. In practice, however, needs assessments were generally conducted through research, interviews and discussions, the results of which were subsequently entered into Focus. The software itself, staff members suggested, did not provide sufficient guidance to the needs assessment process.

49. Emergency operations expressed particular frustration with respect to the fact that limited access to rapidly moving beneficiary populations prevented them from conducting comprehensive assessments in any meaningful sense. Their assessments were, on the whole, extrapolations from existing and often out-of-date information.
Resource mobilization

50. While it is still too early to make an effective assessment of this issue, the operations consulted in the course of this review generally perceived few immediate benefits from the CNA in terms of improved funding. The resources that UNHCR is able to mobilize appear to depend much more on the level of donor state interest in an operation than on UNHCR’s comprehensive assessment.

51. According to one interviewee, UNHCR is increasingly being asked by donors to implement their projects in countries and regions of strategic concern, suggesting that the balance of responsibility for needs assessment and programme design is shifting away from UNHCR and towards those who finance the organization’s budget.

52. Field staff also drew attention to the potential misunderstandings that can arise in relation to host governments as a result of the CNA. One operation spoke for others in saying “when they saw what our CNA budget was, the government here asked what we had spent all the money on.” In this case, publicly communicating a ‘comprehensive budget’ which was in fact an appeal for funds resulted in a reduction of trust between UNHCR and the host government, whose expectations had been raised by the CNA.

Inter-agency cooperation

53. Relatively little can be said at this stage with respect to the linkage between UNHCR’s CNA to broader planning exercises such as joint UN appeals and UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF). In general, the CNA was seen as a useful needs assessment and planning exercise by both UNHCR and other UN personnel, providing information and insights that could be fed into such broader planning exercises.

54. At a time when the UN is striving to function in an increasingly integrated manner, the CNA should assist UNHCR to ensure that refugee and displacement-related issues are given due attention by UN Country Teams. At the same time, officials from other UN organizations pointed out that if that objective is to be achieved, UNHCR must ensure that the terminology and definitions that it uses in relations to concepts such as ‘goals’, ‘objectives’, ‘outputs’ and ‘outcomes’ must be consistent with those employed by the UN at large.

Conclusion

55. As with other aspects of RBM implementation, the communications and instructions provided to the field in relation to the CNA appear to have lacked clarity or not been fully understood. In some cases, different Headquarters entities had attempted to clarify the instructions, but had given contradictory or confusing advice.

56. It also became apparent in the course of this review that the GNA pilots undertaken by UNHCR had not been pilots in the classic sense. As far as field
operations were aware, there had not been a significant effort to learn globally from the experience of the pilots or even to debrief the participants in the pilots.

57. While some useful CNA tools have been developed, there would still appear to be scope for the development of a methodology, or set of methodologies, for conducting comprehensive needs assessments in different types of environment (emergency and non-emergency, camp-based and urban, for example) building on the CNA experience to date.

58. Despite such constraints, the overall conclusion of this review is that the comprehensive needs assessment process, together with the comprehensive plan and budget, will prove to be useful additions to UNHCR’s planning processes. They would be more manageable if they took place less frequently, especially in those countries and regions with more stable situations, and covered a longer timeframe.
Initial Budget Targets and prioritization

59. While the CNA provides the basis for a comprehensive plan and budget for each UNHCR operation, the organization is currently not in a position to undertake all of the activities or to raise the funds that are deemed necessary to meet all the needs of persons of concern. The Initial Budget Target (IBT) is the mechanism that has been introduced to address this situation.

60. In all cases, the IBT is lower than the comprehensive budget, requiring operations to initially limit and prioritize their activities. The IBT is simultaneously a spending authority for Representatives, as well as a first hurdle fundraising target. If fundraising efforts are successful in the course of the year, then the spending authority can be increased, allowing operations to undertake more of the activities envisaged in the comprehensive plan.

61. General policy guidance on this matter was provided in December 2008, when the field was asked to “prioritize interventions that are central to UNHCR’s mandate; raise the current situation to acceptable standards (focusing on critical needs first); and yield high protection dividends, such as registration, education and livelihoods.”

62. A number of other priorities were also identified, including activities that prevent a weakening of the international protection regime; activities that strengthen state and community protection capacities; as well as those that provide solutions to persons of concern.

Findings in the field

63. There is a general recognition in the field that prioritization is a necessary consequence of the comprehensive approach to needs assessment, and most of the operations consulted in the course of this review did not find this to be a particularly difficult exercise. One exception was to be found in a country where prioritization was undertaken in a consultative manner, and where there were conflicting views amongst staff over the closure of field offices.

64. In general, budgets were reduced from the CNA level to the IBT level by reducing the scale of activities, rather than reducing the scope or number of activities. In other words, fewer latrines were dug, fewer border guards were trained and fewer shelters were constructed than envisaged in the comprehensive plan.

CNA-IBT convergence

65. Within UNHCR there is an expectation that the CNA and IBT budget figures will converge over time. The 2010 and 2011 CNA and IBT figures for the operations included in this review would appear to support this conjecture. CNA figures for 2011 were set lower than the previous year, seeming to suggest that the comprehensive budgets for that year are more modest in their expectations.
66. While this might be seen as an understandable and pragmatic response to the challenge of funding constraints and prioritization, it could also be interpreted as a move back to the days when UNHCR budgets were based on anticipated levels of funding rather than on a comprehensive assessment of needs.

**IBT levels**

67. Two of the principal comments expressed by staff in the field were (a) that they had been given an IBT without any real explanation as to the basis on which it had been calculated, and (b) that the level of the IBT remained inadequate in relation to the needs of their operation. These considerations have prompted a degree of disillusionment with the CNA process, with staff members in operations that did not receive an increase in their IBT asking why they are required to plan and budget twice.

**Workload**

68. More generally, field staff expressed their reservations with respect to the number of times plans and budgets have to be prepared and revised as a result of the CNA-IBT arrangements.

69. Typically, CNA plans and budgets are prepared first. Then an indicative IBT is issued, after which operations prepare a first draft prioritized plan and budget. Then the actual IBT is issued, entailing another revision to plans and budgets. The latter is entered into Focus, while the first draft is handled entirely outside the Focus or MSRP systems. The amount of work involved in the prioritization, planning and budgeting process has been augmented by the technical problems associated with the interface between Focus and MSRP, an issue examined later in this report.

**Implementing partners**

70. The introduction of the CNA-IBT system appears to have had some contradictory implications for UNHCR’s relationship with its implementing partners and other stakeholders. Field staff in some operations noted that the CNA had encouraged them to spend more time and effort in undertaking consultations with such actors, while those in others suggested that the demands of the planning process had produced the opposite effect.

71. In general, the operations consulted felt that the spending authority given to them by the IBT had been particularly helpful in enabling them to sign timely contracts of sufficiently long duration with their implementing partners.

**Conclusion**

72. From a field perspective, the relationship between the CNA, IBT and the prioritization process has proven to be a difficult and sometimes frustrating one to manage. It is consequently of some interest that one of the operations included in this
review proposed an alternative approach, described as follows in a mission report prepared after a visit to that country:

In general, UNHCR staff in the operation expressed the view that planning within known funding parameters would be a more effective and efficient way of using their time. More specifically, it was suggested that detailed planning could be undertaken within projected resources, and that additional scenarios could also be established with respect to what might be done should additional funding become available.

Rather than trying to assess the potential implications of a resource shortfall, prioritized planning should build on the existing programme, identifying (a) the results that need to be maintained, (b) the objectives that could be met if additional resources were provided, and (c) the specific interventions and projects that need to be ‘queued up’ in the event that the ‘extra million dollars’ became available.

73. This proposal seems to offer a creative compromise between the resource based planning and prioritization undertaken by UNHCR and the needs based approach that the organization has adopted since the introduction of the CNA. As such, it is worthy of more detailed consideration.
Global Strategic Priorities

74. In a document issued in August 2009, UNHCR Headquarters states that “the Global Strategic Priorities (GSPs) will be used by all offices to identify and make detailed plans for the activities that they will implement as a matter of priority. They will guide the allocation of resources towards objectives that are central to UNHCR’s mandate, raise standards considerably and bring high protection and solutions dividends.” The document also notes that the GSPs “reflect the most pressing global problems and objectives identified in UNHCR’s 2010-2011 assessments and plans.”

75. The GSPs for 2010-2011 are a set of 40 individual statements of intent, structured around seven broad priorities which correspond to the Rights Groups in the Results Framework (examined in the following chapter of this report). Under each statement of intent are a set of indicators, also taken from the Results Framework.

76. In total, there are 95 indicators in the GSPs, each of which has a description of the current situation and an associated target. It is assumed that those targets are achievable over a two-year period, as long as funds are available at the level of the CNA/GNA.

Findings in the field

77. On the basis of the guidance provided by headquarters, the GSPs would appear to be both a global consolidation of the priorities identified by the field, and a means whereby country operations can establish their plans and priorities. In general, however, the evidence collected in the course of this review suggests that the GSPs have little impact on UNHCR’s field operations.

78. Most of the staff members interviewed perceived the GSPs as a list of things that UNHCR has said it would do or would like to do. They see some value in the GSPs as a point of reference, a communication tool and a checklist of activities which can help to ensure a degree of alignment and consistency in UNHCR’s global operations. Their role in the practical process of planning and prioritization, however, was considered to be minimal.

79. According to one staff member, “the GSPs are good to remind us what we are all about, but not to prioritize at the country level.” In the words of another, “while it is hard to argue that any of the items listed in the GSPs is not a priority for UNHCR, it is difficult to suggest that they are all of equal priority in every operation where UNHCR is working. How can we use the GSPs to prioritize when everything we do is on the list and our budget is limited?”

Objectives, targets and indicators

80. On the basis of this review, it might be concluded that the GSPs should not be regarded as a guide to decision-making on field priorities, but as a means whereby
UNHCR can establish targets and a scorecard of progress in relation to the most important activities undertaken by UNHCR at a global level.

81. This is certainly an approach that is endorsed and welcomed by many of the major contributors to UNHCR’s budget, and if undertaken in an effective manner could provide valuable support to the organization’s resource mobilization efforts. At field level, however, there is a degree of scepticism with respect to the targets and indicators set out in the GSPs, especially if the organization is expected to report on them in a quantitative manner.

82. In the area of education, for example, the GSPs state that “UNHCR’s priority is to ensure that boys and girls of concern have equal access to quality primary and secondary education.” In terms of targets and indicators, however, the GSPs focus exclusively on the issue of enrolment levels, a statistical measure that says little or nothing about the quality of education that children are receiving.

83. As this example indicates, one of the risks perceived by UNHCR staff in relation to the implementation of RBM is that of focusing on outcomes that are relatively easy to measure, while paying less attention to equally or more important outcomes that require alternative assessment methods.

Conclusion

84. At the time of writing, new guidance and instructions were issued to the field on Prioritized Planning and Detailed Budgeting for 2011, which asked all operations to include in their IBT plans and Partner Agreements the applicable GSP-related objectives and indicators. A Practical Guide on Integrating the GSPs within 2011 Prioritized Plans accompanies the instructions. It remains to be seen how these GSPs will relate to the priorities set under the results framework in terms of planning, implementation and reporting.
Results Framework

85. UNHCR’s Results Framework is a standardized logframe which can in principle be employed to categorize all of UNHCR’s activities. At the top level of the framework are Population Planning Groups, defined in a UNHCR glossary as one or more population segments of the population of concern, considered as a group for planning purposes.” Somewhat confusingly, these planning groups are “associated with” but not identical to the four “population types” found in the new planning and budget structure, i.e. refugees, stateless people, returnees and internally displaced populations.4

86. For each population planning group, one or more goals are identified, while at the next level down, the framework lists nine Rights Groups, under which one finds 78 standard which identify the various populations of concern to the organization. For each population planning group, one or more goals are identified, while at the next level down, the framework lists nine Rights Groups, under which one finds 78 standard objectives.

87. Each Rights Group corresponds to a type of support provided by UNHCR, following the lifecycle from flight to durable solutions and include, for example, Fair Protection Processes and Documentation, Security from Violence and Exploitation, and Basic Needs and Essential Services. They correspond in large part to the key GSPs.

88. Each objective in the framework has a set of predesignated outputs, of which there are 770 in total. The framework has a linear and hierarchical logic, suggesting that if all outputs are achieved, objectives and goals will also be attained.

89. The results framework is linked to UNHCR’s budget and accounting structure. This means that in principle, the organization’s budgets can be constructed to estimate how much it would cost to deliver each output, while its accounting system can demonstrate how much each output actually costs to deliver.5

90. Each objective and each output are also linked to an impact and a performance indicator respectively. The purpose of the impact indicators is to “measure change in the situation of persons of concern” and the purpose of the performance indicators is to “measure progress towards completing actions (outputs) necessary to achieve the objective.” The indicators are also predesignated, and linked to their corresponding objective or output.

91. One of the key stated purposes of standardizing UNHCR’s planning and budgeting in this way is to better analyze the work of the organization. According to one document, “because all operations use a common Results Framework... the extent to which the situation of populations of concern falls below acceptable

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4 Refugees in urban refugees, for example, are a ‘population planning group’ within the broader ‘population type’ of refugee.
5 It should be noted that while comprehensive planning and budgeting was done mostly at output level, the detailed budgeting for 2010 has been done at objective level. The same is the case for 2011.
standards and the measures planned to meet the corresponding needs can be viewed and compared across operations.”

92. Linking the planning framework to the budget structure also has significant claimed benefits. In the words of another paper:

Through the new Budget Structure, which is also aligned to our Results Framework, for the first time the cost of our efforts and activities can be budgeted directly to results ... Together, our comprehensive plans and budgets will enable us to present budgets that are required for us to fully meet our responsibilities and to illustrate the severe consequences to refugees and others of concern when our financial resources do not enable us to fully respond to their needs.

93. In summary, therefore, the introduction of the Results Framework is an ambitious attempt to standardize and classify the work of UNHCR so as to enable the cross-country analysis of the organization’s activities, costs and results.

Findings in the field

94. In the field, the Results Framework was generally perceived in positive terms. Most interviewees found it a comprehensive and meaningful way of structuring their work, especially at the top level of rights groups. They also suggested that the framework had introduced greater discipline, obliging staff to ensure that proposed objectives and activities addressed identified problems.

95. Some UNHCR staff members found that the standardized lists of objectives and outputs were a helpful aid to the planning process. More frequently, however, interviewees commented that some of the standard outputs did not usefully correspond to the activities that they wanted to implement.

96. In relation to the issue of communication, some UNHCR and partner staff found notions such as ‘populations types’, ‘population planning group’ and ‘rights groups’ to be unfamiliar and not immediately evident in their meaning or relationship to each other.

Budgeting and apportionment

97. The use of the Results Framework in budgeting was also generally welcomed. According to one interlocutor, “the activity/objective based budget structure represents our work much better than the old ‘care and maintenance’ type of budget headers.”

98. The most negative comments in relation to budgeting were expressed in relation to staff time apportionment. For budgeting purposes, operations are now required to identify the proportion of staff time allocated to each objective, which in theory provides a more accurate view of the costs involved in achieving an objective. In practice, field staff found this task burdensome and frustrating, while staff
timesheets were seen as the inevitable but unwelcome result of any attempt to apportion costs in this way.

Indicators and attribution

99. The standard indicators included in the Results Framework and Focus attracted considerable comment from staff in the field. For some, they were considered to be unworkable, and so they were ignored. Others took a more diligent approach, and tried hard to fill in baseline and target data for the indicators. Even so, many struggled with this task.

100. Some interviewees questioned the ability to attribute results to UNHCR outputs, observing that many other factors besides UNHCR programmes (especially host government policies) affect the achievement of objectives such as “potential for local integration realized”, and noting the danger of equating the protection and well-being of persons of concern with the quality of UNHCR’s work.

101. On this basis, some interviewees suggested that the most UNHCR can do is to cost out the outputs that it delivers, rather than results achieved. It was also suggested that attribution is even more difficult outside of camps, where variables besides UNHCR’s activities are more influential in determining the situation of persons of concern.

102. Many other comments were made about the indicators, a sample of which follow:

a) the terminology is undefined or unclear (e.g. what do “enhanced self-reliance,” or “adequate dwelling” actually mean for the purposes of measurement?);

b) the collection methodology is not specified (e.g. for the indicator “# of persons allowed to achieve enhanced self reliance” what does it mean to be ‘allowed’ and who makes that judgement?);

c) comparability between years and between countries is difficult, especially in relation to ‘extent’ indicators and standards (e.g. is an adequate dwelling in Somalia the same as an adequate dwelling in Serbia?);

d) some indicators are not relevant to the objective (e.g. “% of children with psycho/social needs receiving support/assistance” does not indicate the objective “Protection of children strengthened”; it is a measure of service delivery rather than an assessment of whether children are actually safer);

e) time-lags: for some activities and outputs the results will only be apparent some months or years later, and this should be better reflected in the Results Framework,

f) where proxy indicators are used, the theory of why the proxy should indicate the achievement of the objective needs to be made explicit;

g) there seems to be no continuity between the Results Framework indicators and those in the Standards and Indicators guide and report;
h) activities that are not directly service delivery activities, such as advocacy and capacity building, were seen as being poorly suited to the RBM approach and the kind of indicators provided in the Results Framework;

i) the measurement of baselines and indicators is potentially costly and complex, especially when research and surveys are needed and in relation to issues such as SGBV and the situation of refugees in urban areas.

103. Implementing partners were some of the most critical commentators in relation to the standard indicators. In many cases, IP agreements included additional indicators that were not in the Results Framework but which were seen as more relevant to planned activities and objectives. New guidance from UNHCR Headquarters sensibly acknowledges this problem and asks country offices to include additional indicators as they find relevant to their operations.

Conclusion

104. The strength of the Results Framework is to be found in its comprehensive account of UNHCR’s work, and is most helpful when applied to tasks such as planning and budgeting. As noted above, the major limitation of the framework is to be found in the indicators which, according to some field staff, are unworkable in their current form.

105. The indicators can be improved by clarifying terminology and providing more detailed instructions on data collection, providing the Results Framework with a greater potential to measure change in the situation of persons of concern. It seems unlikely, however, that the Results Framework will be able to provide a precise attribution of such change to the work of UNHCR. In that respect, alternative and more qualitative methodologies will be needed to assess the impact of UNHCR programmes.
Focus

106. The Focus software system is the tool that brings together the different elements of RBM in UNHCR. Focus was introduced in early 2009, with all operations expected to use it for planning and preparing their 2010 budgets.

107. It was also expected that in 2010, operations would use the system for current reporting, while in early 2011, the first annual reports would be prepared using the Focus software. The new software was introduced to UNHCR staff through a series of 30 regional and country-level five-day workshops.

108. There seems to be no single statement of objectives or expectations for Focus, but many claims have been made for the system in a number of different UNHCR documents. For example:

Focus facilitates planning and subsequent operations management. It enables the clear linking of assessments, objectives, and activities (including financial, material and human resources) to results. In addition, it will enable more streamlined reporting and better information sharing.

Focus is designed to help operations teams to plan and manage together. It can be used in meetings and workshop settings with the group selecting options and one person making changes. At other times, different team members may be working separately on refining different aspects of the plan, then saving and synchronizing so that others can see the changes on their desktops.

It is possible to see in Focus where needs are greatest in terms of access to education, free movement and self-reliance. The extent to which sexual and gender-based violence affects different communities can be viewed, as well as the measures proposed to prevent and respond to these risks.

The Focus software is a powerful and dynamic means of reviewing, comparing, and contrasting the well-being of all whom UNHCR seeks to protect. Over time, it will enable the Office to assess different needs, adjust its priorities and, ultimately, reach a more informed basis for allocating resources.

109. Such statements present two main claims for the Focus system. First, that it is a project and programme management system, assisting operations with the design of their programmes and managing their implementation. The second is that it is also a global management information system, able to analyze the situation of populations of concern, comparing them across countries and assisting in resource allocation.
Findings in the field

110. When first introduced, the Focus software generated a considerable amount of interest and even excitement within UNHCR. While field staff continue to recognize the substantial potential of Focus in relation to functions such as planning, programming, budgeting and monitoring, their enthusiasm for it (and for RBM in general) has been dimmed by the well-documented technical difficulties and demands associated with Focus since its introduction.

111. Perceptions of Focus may also be influenced by the fact that only the planning and budgeting components of Focus are in regular use, while the reporting modules have yet to be used extensively. The power of the budgeting function is especially appreciated and compared favourably to the earlier online budgeting module found in MSRP.

112. At the same time, there is general scepticism as to whether Focus will be able to generate reports comparable to the Annual Protection Reports, a document that many UNHCR staff, both in the field and at Headquarters, would like to see reinstated.

Problem analysis

113. The problem analysis function in Focus was said by many interviewees to be superficial and misleading. When that function is employed, Focus first proposes causes for the problems identified, and then offers solutions to those causes. Both causes and solutions are selected from standard drop-down lists of options.

114. To give one example, the problem ‘population is at risk from gender-based violence’ elicits the following possible causes:

- potential partner resources not yet fully engaged;
- insufficient consideration of age, gender and diversity issues in operation;
- persons at risk lack access to justice and legal advice;
- living at home is not safe; and,
- response mechanisms need strengthening.

115. In fact, only one of these statements – living at home is not safe - constitutes a ‘real’ cause. And it in turn requires further explanation; namely, why is living at home not safe? The other so-called causes are in fact absences of solutions (lacking access to justice, resources not yet engaged, response mechanisms need strengthening).

116. This is not a minor issue, but one that goes to the heart of the planning approach. Without an ability to get to the real root causes of identified problems, the system only proposes superficial solutions. In this respect, the apparent sophistication of a modern software system is seen by many as a poor substitute for more conventional and flexible forms of problem analysis.
Using Focus

117. Those interviewees who had received technical training in Focus during 2009 commented that it gave them a reasonable understanding of the Focus system, despite the technical problems it was encountering. However, many also commented that the training was too technically oriented and did not give sufficient attention to the overall concept of RBM and the rationale for its implementation.

118. Although the intention of Focus is for it to be used as a ‘live’ planning tool, the general pattern of use seen in the field was that operations develop their plans ‘offline’ in a normal workshop setting and using familiar language. One technically competent member of staff then takes the plans that have been developed and enters them into Focus, selecting ‘best fit’ terminology to represent their intentions. This process was described by one interlocutor as “retro-fitting.”

119. The interface between Focus and the MSRP finance system was widely regarded as cumbersome and fraught with inconsistencies. Budget revisions are time-consuming and operations tend to collect a number of revisions together before uploading them into MSRP because of the delays experienced.

Access and support

120. The ‘token’ system which provides access to Focus is widely criticised for being unwieldy and complex, although some field operations have developed effective protocols to allow different members of the UNHCR team to make use of the system at particular times. There is some concern that as the functionality of the Focus increases, the token system will become even more cumbersome.

121. Sub and field offices had very little access to Focus, and in at least two cases, had to travel to the main office in order to enter their plans and budgets. For larger operations, sub-offices did have access, but a complicated arrangement of phone calls and arranged days had to be established to allow access through the token system.

122. None of the offices visited had access to Global Focus, the worldwide data analysis system that reads data entered into Focus. This was because of technical difficulties and bandwidth restrictions as well as limited access rights.

123. In the countries visited, technical support for Focus was obtained primarily through personal contacts. Those operations with staff members who had previously worked on some aspect of the Focus system at Headquarters were thus at a distinct advantage. One such operation commented that “we have no idea how we would have coped if [x] hadn’t been with us.”

Conclusion

124. As stated earlier, field staff generally acknowledge the potential of Focus and are striving hard to utilize the system in an effective manner. Many consider it to have been rolled out too hastily, however, and suggest that premature claims were made for both its uses and usability.
125. Most seriously perhaps, many staff members perceive Focus (and compliance with its requirements) as the key component of RBM in UNHCR. The wider purpose of RBM, which is to foster an organizational culture that is oriented towards maximizing and demonstrating the impact of UNHCR’s activities on persons of concern, has been somewhat overshadowed.
Budget structure

126. UNHCR’s new budget structure was initially introduced as a way of showing the organization’s global expenditure on different population groups. The budget’s four-pillar structure is defined as follows in one UNHCR document:

I. Global Refugee Programme: This pillar relates to UNHCR’s refugee mandate. It covers protection, assistance and durable solutions activities in countries of asylum, together with capacity building, advocacy, and resource mobilization activities. As part of its durable solutions content, the pillar includes all activities undertaken to facilitate and support the voluntary repatriation of refugees, including immediate assistance for a limited period following return.

II. Global Stateless Programme: This second pillar relates to UNHCR’s mandate for statelessness. It covers all UNHCR’s programmes addressing stateless people, including populations with undetermined nationality.

III. Global Reintegration Projects: This third pillar addresses an area where UNHCR has joint responsibilities with other United Nations agencies… It covers all long term activities to reintegrate returning refugees in their country of origin or to locally integrate refugees in their country of asylum.

IV. Global Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Projects: This fourth pillar covers all internally displaced persons (IDP) operations. To the extent that UNHCR is called upon to become involved in the reintegration of IDPs in any given situation, these activities will be funded under the IDP pillar, not the reintegration pillar which is reserved for refugees.

127. According to another document, the new budget structure “provides a high level view of UNHCR’s planned objectives and results applicable to different populations,” and in this respect can be seen as a manifestation of UNHCR’s commitment to the RBM approach.

128. All of UNHCR’s operational budgets for 2010 were expected to be prepared in accordance with this structure. The IBTs were set by pillar, meaning that rather than having an overall spending authority which could be allocated and spent as necessary, each Representative was given a specific spending authority for each population planning group.

129. Pillars I and II were expected to be financed from core budget funds, while Pillars III and IV would be financed by earmarked project funds. According to one instruction, “funds received for the refugee and stateless programmes cannot be reallocated to projects for reintegration or for IDPs.”
Findings in the field

130. In the field, some positive general comments were made about the notion of structuring budgets according to the different categories of people that are of concern to UNHCR. More specifically, it was suggested that the new budget structure represents a valuable and creative attempt to reconcile UNHCR’s core mandate with the considerable diversification that has taken place in the organization’s operational activities over the past 20 years – an issue that has been of some concern to those states that fund the organization’s budget.

Programme complexity

131. In countries where the pillars were aligned with population planning groups (PPG), the introduction of the new budget structure has been a relatively simple process.

132. However, for those countries where there was either more than one PPG per pillar, or more than one pillar per PPG (both in one case), the new structure has entailed a significantly greater degree of complexity in managing funds and budgets. In such operations, each output has to be represented under six different headings: Objective, Rights Group, Goal, Population Planning Group and Pillar.

133. The near-but-not-quite alignment of Population Planning Group with Pillar presents a particular source of confusion, most notably in relation to Pillars I and III. More specifically, in a country where refugees have the option of local integration (Tanzania being a case in point) it is not clear when a mandated durable solutions activity for refugees (Pillar I) becomes a longer-term activity that is regarded as the broader responsibility of the UN system (Pillar III).

Resource mobilization

134. The review team heard some mixed opinions with respect to the implications of the new budget structure, as well as the CNA-IBT system, for fundraising. Some argued that there were no longer incentives for local fundraising for Pillars III and IV, because any funds raised in this respect were absorbed into the IBT level for those pillars (perceived by field staff as funding they had anyway) rather than being additional, as was previously the case.

135. In one case, where some modest funding was raised locally, the UNHCR office suggested that the donor give money directly to the implementing partner, rather than go through the process of modifying plans, budgets and authorizing changes to the IBT.

136. In another case, funds were raised locally, not for the activities within the prioritized plan, but rather for activities in the comprehensive plan. In this case, the operation had to modify its prioritized plan to include the activities the donor wanted to fund, and to deprioritize activities that had been included in its prioritized plan.
137. There were also mixed opinions with respect to the question of whether the new budget structure encourages or discourages the earmarking of funds. Some argue that the pillars present donors with a straightforward choice as to which pillar they allocate their funds, and that the new budget structure encourages earmarking. Others suggest that without the new budget structure, donors would in fact make tighter earmarking choices, such as tying funds to a particular country or project.

**Conclusion**

138. The new budget structure has had a mixed reception. Some welcome the clarity it brings to the global picture of where funds are allocated, others criticise it for bringing additional complexity and rigidity into the management of funds.

139. It is also possible that the new structure, as well as the CNA-IBT system, has reduced the incentives to raise funds locally, because of the greater amount of consultation and decision-making that is required in order to accept funds and determine IBT levels.
Annex A:

Information note
29 July 2010

Results-based programming in UNHCR

Background

UNHCR launched a comprehensive management and structural reform process in February 2006. Explaining the rationale for this process later the same year, the High Commissioner remarked upon UNHCR’s “pressing need for deep structural and management reform”, which, he said, “is absolutely indispensable if we are to build a stronger, more effective organization, able to generate and direct more resources to the people we care for.”

Three years later, in his closing statement to the 2009 meeting of the Executive Committee, the High Commissioner took note of the Committee’s encouragement to for UNHCR to consolidate the process of management and structural reform. “Consolidation,” he observed, “does not mean that things will become static, but rather that we will focus on fine-tuning processes so as to improve delivery capacity.”

The exercise outlined in this note is intended to assist UNHCR in the attainment of that objective by taking stock of the progress that has been attained so far and the constraints that have been encountered in the implementation of management reform. Given the breath of the reforms and the need to make this exercise a manageable one, it will address one component of the process, namely that of results-based programming (RBP).

More specifically, the exercise will address the following six initiatives and mechanisms:

1. The Comprehensive Needs Assessment;
2. Initial Budget Targets;
3. The Global Strategic Priorities;
4. The Results Framework;
5. the Focus software;
6. The new UNHCR budget structure.

The exercise will be complemented by other efforts to take stock of the reform process, including a review of regionalization (to be undertaken by ODMS) and two workshops (organized by DPSM) on Focus, to be held in Geneva and Nairobi.
Assessment questions

In order to assess the six elements listed above, the exercise will be based on a number of assessment questions:

- what impact (if any) have these initiatives had on UNHCR staff, the organization’s relationship with key partners and persons of concern?
- have UNHCR staff been adequately trained in these initiatives, and are they able to understand and make effective use of them?
- are these initiatives improving UNHCR’s ability to map the total needs of populations of concern?
- are these initiatives allowing UNHCR to carry out more effective planning to meet those needs?
- are these initiatives enhancing UNHCR’s advocacy and resource mobilization efforts?

Given that the introduction of RBP, especially the development of the software required to support its formalization, is a relatively recent development, this exercise will focus primarily on the ongoing process of implementation and its initial outcome, and will not seek to address its anticipated longer-term impact.

Methods

The exercise will be based primarily on ‘snapshots’ of four field locations: Georgia, Sudan, Tanzania and Yemen, to be undertaken in late August and early September 2010.

The missions will draw from a pool of suitably qualified staff members from DER, DFAM, DPSM, ODM and PDES, as well as the Deputy High Commissioner’s Office. Each mission will spend up to four full working days in the field.

This pool of staff members will hold one or more preparatory meetings before the missions are initiated, so as to ensure a common understanding of the purpose, focus and methodology of the exercise.

To broaden the focus of the exercise, the three snapshots will be complemented by:

- a review of relevant documents related to results-based programming in UNHCR;
- interviews with key staff members at Headquarters;
- a questionnaire to be completed by selected field offices.

A wrap-up workshop and a synthesis report will be prepared once the snapshots have been completed. These components of the exercise will be led by an independent consultant.

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6 The criteria are derived in large part from a 2009 Standing Committee paper which set out UNHCR’s key objectives in relation to the introduction of RBP. It should be noted that the US government is currently planning a field mission to Asia (probably Thailand) to examine and assess the UNHCR reform process, employing a similar set of criteria.
Annex B:

**Abbreviations and acronyms**

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>DFAM</td>
<td>Division of Financial and Administrative Management</td>
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<td>DPSM</td>
<td>Division of Programme Support and Management</td>
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<td>DRRMS</td>
<td>Donor Relations and Resource Mobilisation Service</td>
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<td>GNA</td>
<td>Global Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>GSPs</td>
<td>Global Strategic Priorities</td>
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<td>IBT</td>
<td>Initial Budget Target</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
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<td>MSRP</td>
<td>Managing Systems, Resources, and People</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODMS</td>
<td>Organizational Development Management Service</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PBS</td>
<td>Programme Budget Service</td>
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<td>PDES</td>
<td>Policy Development and Evaluation Service</td>
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<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results Based Management</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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